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Perhaps the most important single finding in the field of emotional aging has been
that the overall quality of affective experience steadily improves during adulthood and
can be maintained into old age. Recent lifespan developmental theories have provided
motivation- and experience-based explanations for this phenomenon. These theories
suggest that, as individuals grow older, they become increasingly motivated and able
to regulate their emotions, which could result in reduced negativity and enhanced
positivity. The objective of this paper is to expand existing theories and empirical research
on emotional aging by presenting a discrete emotions perspective. To illustrate the
usefulness of this approach, we focus on a discussion of the literature examining age
differences in anger and sadness. These two negative emotions have typically been
subsumed under the singular concept of negative affect. From a discrete emotions
perspective, however, they are highly distinct and show multidirectional age differences.
We propose that such contrasting age differences in specific negative emotions have
important implications for our understanding of long-term patterns of affective well-being
across the adult lifespan.
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The single most important finding in the field of emotional
aging is perhaps that affective well-being does not decline dur-
ing most of the adult lifespan (e.g., Charles and Carstensen, 2007;
Scheibe and Carstensen, 2010; Isaacowitz and Blanchard-Fields,
2012). Research based on the most prominent life-span theories
of developmental regulation and emotional aging have provided
different explanations for this phenomenon by examining broad
dimensions of emotions (i.e., negative affect and positive affect;
e.g., Baltes and Baltes, 1990; Brandtstädter and Greve, 1994;
Heckhausen, 1997; Carstensen, 2006). Complementing these the-
ories, we present a discrete emotions perspective, that considers
specific positive and negative emotions. To illustrate the useful-
ness of this approach, we focus on a discussion of age differences
in the experience of anger and sadness. These two negative emo-
tions have typically been subsumed under the singular concept
of negative affect. From a discrete emotions perspective, however,
they are highly distinct and showmultidirectional age differences.
We propose that such contrasting age differences in specific emo-
tions have important implications for understanding long-term
patterns of affective well-being across the adult lifespan.
LIFE-SPAN THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGULATION
AND EMOTIONAL AGING
Prominent theories of developmental regulation postulate that
individuals can avoid the adverse emotional effects of life’s chal-
lenges, threats, and losses if they engage in effective self-regulatory
strategies (e.g., Baltes and Baltes, 1990; Brandtstädter and Renner,
1990; Heckhausen et al., 2010). Although the nature of strategies
has been defined and labeled differently by different theories, the
various strategies seem to cluster according to whether they refer
to continued engagement in attaining goals or to disengagement
from unattainable goals (Haase et al., 2013). Further, the extent to
which these two higher-order categories of developmental regula-
tion protect affective well-being is thought to differ as a function
of an individual’s place in the life-cycle, which can be considered a
proxy for individual differences in control opportunities and con-
straints. Given that individuals’ capacity to influence their envi-
ronment is relatively high in young adulthood and often declines
in old age, processes of goal engagement should be used more
frequently and adaptive in young adulthood. Processes of goal dis-
engagement, by contrast, should become increasingly salient and
adaptive in older adulthood. A large number of longitudinal and
intervention studies have supported these propositions (reviews:
Wrosch et al., 2006; Heckhausen et al., 2010).
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006;
Scheibe and Carstensen, 2010; Reed and Carstensen, 2012), a
prominent theory of emotional aging, explains the maintenance
of affective well-being in old age by focusing on future-related
expectations, particularly older individuals’ estimations of their
remaining life-time. According to SST, because advancing age is
naturally associated with endings and a limited lifetime, older
adults prioritize social and emotional goals related to the opti-
mization of immediate affective well-being over longer-term
knowledge-related goals aimed at optimizing future resources
(Carstensen et al., 1999). In support of SST’s main predic-
tions, a large body of evidence suggests that, in comparison
with their younger counterparts, older adults are more selective
in their choice of social partners and make their social inter-
actions more emotionally satisfying (reviews: Carstensen et al.,
1999; Fingerman and Charles, 2010). There is also substantial
evidence for systematic age differences in basic affective informa-
tion processing. Older adults appear to be generallymore sensitive
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to positive information and less sensitive to negative informa-
tion than young adults, a phenomenon termed the “positivity
effect” (Carstensen andMikels, 2005). SST states that this positiv-
ity effect is the result of an age-related increase in the allocation of
cognitive resources toward emotion regulation (reviews: Mather
and Carstensen, 2005; Kryla-Lighthall and Mather, 2009; Mather,
2012).
Overall, life-span developmental theories have provided valu-
able insights into how older individuals can maintain or enhance
their affective well-being despite age-related losses in many life
domains. Independent of their specific explanatory processes,
however, affective well-being has been considered in these theo-
ries from a broad and dimensional perspective. That is, research
based on these theories typically examined whether processes of
developmental regulation, socio-emotional selectivity, or biases
in affective information processing are associated with a broader
aggregate of emotional experiences such as positive affect or neg-
ative affect. Past theoretical work is thus well suited to explain age
differences in broad affective dimensions, but it may fall short in
explaining age-differences in the salience and functions of dif-
ferent discrete negative or positive emotions subsumed under
positive or positive affect. As a consequence, a discrete emotions
perspective may be needed to complement past theoretical work.
Such an approach may help better understand multidirectional
age differences in short-term affective reactions and longer-term
affective well-being. In addition, it may raise awareness that emo-
tions are not only consequences of cognitive or motivational
processes, but also can cause effective cognitions and behaviors.
A DISCRETE EMOTIONS PERSPECTIVE ON EMOTIONAL
AGING
Functional emotion theories emphasize the adaptive value of dis-
crete emotions and emotional dispositions (e.g., Frijda, 1986;
Campos et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Izard, 1993; Levenson, 1994;
Ekman, 1999; Keltner and Gross, 1999). According to these the-
ories, emotions provide important information to the self and
others and help motivate our own and others’ behavior. For
example, some emotions push individuals away from certain
thoughts, memories, or actions, whereas other emotions make
certain thoughts, memories, or actions more likely. Functional
approaches traditionally have focused on the adaptive value of
negative emotions. From this perspective, the overall purpose
of negative emotions is to eliminate a threat or an imbalance
between the individual and his or her environment. More specifi-
cally, negative emotions are thought to prompt time-tested adap-
tive actions enabled and supported by specific action tendencies
(Frijda, 1986), patterns of physiological activity (Levenson, 1994),
configurations of facial expressions (Ekman, 1999), and subjec-
tive feelings (e.g., Izard, 1993). Functional approaches to emotion
have emphasized that each discrete negative emotion serves a spe-
cific and distinct function (e.g., fear creates the urge to escape,
disgust the urge to expel; e.g., Frijda, 1986; Levenson, 1992).
AGE DIFFERENCES IN NEGATIVE AFFECT: THE SAMPLE CASE OF
ANGER AND SADNESS
To explore the usefulness of a discrete emotion approach, we
focus on the functions of two emotions, anger and sadness for
two reasons. First, empirical studies examining age differences in
discrete emotions have largely focused on these two emotions.
Second, and more important, different from other discrete emo-
tions, anger and sadness are closely and differentially associated
with the two higher-order classes of developmental regulation,
goal engagement and goal disengagement. As a consequence,
a theoretical framework that addresses age differences in the
salience and adaptivity of anger and sadness appears to be a
reasonable starting point for developing a more comprehensive
discrete emotions approach.
A central tenet of theories of life-span development has been
that each stage in the life cycle is characterized by a specific con-
figuration of environmental challenges as well as personal needs,
beliefs, and future expectations (e.g., Heckhausen and Schulz,
1995). We build on this assumption and argue that age-specific
configurations may increase or decrease the experience and adap-
tive value of specific emotions (see also Haase et al., 2012). This
proposition provides a theoretically important extension of func-
tional emotion theories as it suggests that not only the emotion
itself but also characteristics of the individual and his or her
immediate and broader social context, most of which substan-
tially change across the adult life-span, determine the adaptive
value of specific emotions.
To begin, young adulthood has been described as a phase of
growth during which individuals have greater opportunities to
develop their potentials than their older counterparts. Thus, pro-
cesses of growth and optimization rather than maintenance or
compensation should have priority in young adulthood (Baltes
and Baltes, 1990; Freund and Baltes, 1998, 2002; Ebner et al.,
2006). Consistent with this view, SST assumes that young, as com-
pared with older adults’ goals tend to bemore future-oriented and
focused on acquiring new resources such as knowledge or infor-
mation (e.g., Carstensen et al., 1999). Moreover, life-span theories
of developmental regulation (e.g., Brandtstädter and Greve, 1994;
Heckhausen et al., 2010) have proposed that, in young adulthood,
perceptions of high personal control and a tenacious pursuit
of goals are not only highly prevalent, but also closely tied to
well-being (Wrosch and Heckhausen, 1999; Rothermund and
Brandtstädter, 2003; Lachman, 2006). Finally, there is evidence
suggesting that individuals are most willing to engage in and
reflect on social conflicts when they are young (Labouvie-Vief
et al., 1989; Birditt and Fingerman, 2005; Blanchard-Fields et al.,
2007).
Given that young adults typically pursue many future-related
goals and have a strong need to accomplish them, the elicitor of
anger, which is the appraisal that one’s own goals are intentionally
ignored or blocked by others, should be particularly frequent and
salient in young adulthood. In addition, the situational control
appraisals, action tendencies, and social motivations typical of
anger are likely to be more readily accessible in young adulthood
than in old age. In fact, according to discrete emotion theories,
anger prototypically involves the belief in high situational con-
trol (Lazarus, 1991), triggers a reactant “moving against” state
of action readiness (Frijda et al., 1989), and promotes goal per-
sistence (Lench and Levine, 2008). In addition, anger facilitates
efforts to bring others’ behaviors back in line with one’s own
goals (Fischer and Roseman, 2007). Thus, relative to older adults,
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young adults should experience anger more intensively and more
frequently. Moreover, because anger may at times help young
adults to overcome obstacles in accomplishing age-normative
tasks, it could be adaptive, at least in certain contexts, and ben-
efit young adults’ longer-term affective well-being (Haase et al.,
2012).
In marked contrast to young adulthood, old age has been char-
acterized as a phase of loss and decline (Lindenberger and Baltes,
1997; Smith and Baltes, 1997; Baltes and Mayer, 1999) during
which social, cognitive, and physical resources become increas-
ingly limited and processes of maintenance and compensation
gain importance (Baltes and Baltes, 1990; Labouvie-Vief, 2003).
Life-span theories have proposed that, given the limited resources
in old age, perceptions of low personal control and goal adjust-
ment processes become increasingly frequent and adaptive (e.g.,
Wrosch and Heckhausen, 1999; Rothermund and Brandtstädter,
2003; Lachman, 2006). In addition, according to SST, because per-
ceived future life-time shrinks with increasing age, older adults’
tend to be particularly present-oriented in their goal pursuits,
focused on creating emotionally meaningful experiences, and
likely to avoid social conflicts for the sake of maintaining social
harmony in the current moment (Birditt and Fingerman, 2005;
Carstensen, 2006; Blanchard-Fields, 2007).
Given that, relative to young adults, older adults increasingly
face losses of fundamental resources and tend to adjust their goals
accordingly, the elicitor of sadness, that is, the appraisal of a sit-
uation as an irreversible loss, should be particularly frequent and
salient in old age. In addition, the situational control appraisals,
action tendencies, and social motivations that are linked to sad-
ness are likely to be more readily accessible in old age than
in earlier life periods. In support of this assumption, discrete
emotion theories suggest that sadness prototypically goes hand
in hand with a perception of low situational control (Lazarus,
1991). In addition, it triggers processes of adaptive goal disen-
gagement (Frijda et al., 1989; Nesse, 2000; Wrosch and Miller,
2009) and signals to others the need for closeness, sympathy, and
support (Andrews and Thomson, 2009). As a consequence, rela-
tive to young adults, older adults should experience sadness more
intensively and frequently. Moreover, because sadness is likely to
help older adults deal with losses by facilitating disengagement
from unattainable goals and enhancing social support, it could be
adaptive, at least in certain contexts, and facilitate older adults’
longer-term affective well-being (see also Kunzmann and Grühn,
2005; Haase et al., 2012).
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A small but growing body of evidence is consistent with the
notion that sadness and anger follow contrasting trajectories
across the adult life-span. For example, research has shown
that older adults report less anger and anger-related regula-
tory strategies during interpersonal conflicts than their younger
counterparts (Blanchard-Fields and Coats, 2008). An age-related
reduction in the intensity of anger reactivity was also found
when young and older adults were confronted with film clips
of an old woman talking about problems in a nursing home
(Charles et al., 2001) or audio-taped conversations, in which two
individuals were ostensibly making disparaging remarks about a
third person (Charles and Carstensen, 2008). Age differences in
sadness-reactions, by contrast, have been shown to be reversed
(i.e., higher among older adults) or non-significant (Charles et al.,
2001; Charles and Carstensen, 2008). Other studies have investi-
gated age differences in emotional reactions to stimuli specifically
designed to elicit either anger or sadness. In this line of work,
older, as compared with younger, adults reported less anger in
response to anger-eliciting stimuli, but equal or higher sadness in
response to sadness-eliciting stimuli (Tsai et al., 2000; Labouvie-
Vief et al., 2003; Kunzmann and Grühn, 2005; Kunzmann and
Richter, 2009; Seider et al., 2011; Streubel and Kunzmann, 2011).
Age-related differences in the experience of anger and sadness
have also been examined on the level of affect frequency in a lon-
gitudinal field study with a national sample of German adults
covering most of the adult lifespan (Kunzmann et al., 2013). More
specifically, cross-sectional and longitudinal findings from this
study consistently suggest that the frequency of anger increases
from late adolescence into young adulthood, but shows a steady
decrease from midlife to old age. By contrast, the frequency of
sadness remained stable over most of adulthood and increased in
old age (Kunzmann et al., 2013). Extending this work, a recent
study explored age differences in anger and sadness by focusing
on the intensity and frequency of emotional experiences on a
typical day and their implicit associations with participants’ self
(Kunzmann and Thomas, 2014). Consistent with a discrete emo-
tions perspective, older adults experienced anger less frequently
and less intensively than young adults, but there were no age dif-
ferences in the experience of sadness. Furthermore, this study
provided initial evidence for the idea that anger, but not sadness,
becomes less self-descriptive with age (Kunzmann and Thomas,
2014).
Finally, there is preliminary evidence indicating that the effects
of anger and sadness on affective well-being are age-differential as
well (Haase et al., 2012). In this laboratory study, anger experi-
ences in response to neutral film clips with ambiguous contents
were associated with high affective well-being in middle-aged
adults but not in young or older adults. Sadness reactions, by
contrast, were associated with high affective well-being in older
adults, but not in younger or middle-aged adults (Haase et al.,
2012). These findings lend support to our previous predictions,
although according to our framework, anger should be adaptive
in young adulthood as well.
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Life-span theories’ current focus on the explanation of age-related
changes in the overall quality of affective experience does not
account well for multidirectional and multifunctional age differ-
ences in specific emotions. A discrete emotions perspective on
aging therefore complements life-span theories as it allows more
differentiated predictions. According to this view, all emotions—
positive and negative—are adaptive in particular contexts. Thus,
although most individuals value high emotional well-being (Tsai
et al., 2006), and report pro-hedonic emotion regulatory goals
more frequently than contra-hedonic goals (Riediger et al., 2009),
from a functionalist view, a life without negative emotions would
be impoverished, unhealthy, and short. Instead, it assumes that
negative emotions are useful experiences. They serve specific
functions and may be adaptive if they enable individuals to
manage critical life circumstances.
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Our approach and review is consistent with this view by doc-
umenting the usefulness and importance of a discrete emotions
approach. It demonstrates multidirectional age differences in the
experience of anger and sadness by indicating that the salience
of anger decreases across the life-span, particularly during mid-
dle adulthood and old age, whereas the intensity and frequency
of sadness remains stable or increases in old age. In addition,
it provides preliminary evidence suggesting such age differences
in emotional reactions may contribute to individuals’ general
affective well-being.
To further clarify the roles of specific negative emotions, future
research should determine the conditions that give rise to adap-
tive consequences of anger reactions (in young adulthood) and
sadness reactions (in old age). Certainly, chronic or unwarranted
anger and sadness are unlikely to contribute to high affective
well-being at any age. Instead, it may be the match between
situational circumstances and emotional reactions that could
determine the adaptive value of age-related experiences of anger
and sadness. To examine such situation by emotion interactions,
future research should also incorporate time windows of different
lengths because specific negative emotions may not be strongly
associated with high levels of concurrent affective well-being.
Rather, the experience of certain negative emotions could restore
and optimize individuals’ affective well-being over longer peri-
ods of time if they trigger and facilitate behavioral processes that
over time help individuals to adjust successfully to age-related
opportunities and constraints.
A second task for future work is to shed further light on
the mechanisms that can explain age differences in anger and
sadness. Our theoretical framework is motivational in nature in
that we argue that each place in the life-cycle is characterized by
a specific configuration of developmental conditions that make
certain emotions more salient and adaptive. However, theoret-
ical accounts of age differences in cognitive and physiological
resources may provide additional insights (Labouvie-Vief, 2003;
Cacioppo et al., 2011). For example, anger may involve greater
physiological arousal and may require more cognitive resources
than sadness, and this may imply that older adults have fewer
resources to experience anger than sadness.
Finally, it will be interesting to extend our framework by
considering additional distinct negative and positive emotions.
For example, there is preliminary research suggesting age-related
increases in fear and age-related declines in disgust (Kunzmann
et al., 2005; Teachman and Gordon, 2009). Future research should
clarify the mechanisms that underlie such age differences in a
variety of distinct emotions. Research along these lines may also
broaden the age range of inquiry by additionally examining chil-
dren and adolescents and consider the influence of individual
differences in available resources and types of goals. We think
that future research from a discrete emotion perspective is war-
ranted and has the potential to contribute to our understanding
of successful development across the lifespan.
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